WEEK 39
H2F brings you the ‘helicopter mayday of the week’ with a short accident report summary. I tell you what happened. You think more about why it happened. We all learn from it. Because that’s what accident reporting is for.
TITLE
Unrecognised autopilot mode change leads to uncontrolled descent during night offshore approach.
WHAT?
An S-92 helicopter descended significantly below its intended circuit altitude during a night training flight to an offshore drilling rig. The crew recovered following ground proximity warning system alerts, narrowly avoiding a collision with the sea.
WHERE?
Offshore Western Australia.
WHEN?
1 February 2025, approximately 19:40 local time. Final investigation published 4 February 2026.
HOW?
The flight was conducted to maintain three pilots’ night helideck landing currency. The captain was pilot flying (PF) and copilot pilot monitoring (PM). A third pilot occupied a cabin seat.
At 1,500 ft, radar altitude hold was selected to capture the planned circuit height of 660 ft but while descending through 1200 ft, the captain inadvertently selected vertical-speed mode instead of heading hold. This cancelled the altitude capture and established a continuous 500 ft/min descent. The mode change was not verified and the initial error went unnoticed by both pilots.
Believing the helicopter had levelled at 660 ft, the captain asked the copilot to recalculate Vtoss using the electronic flight bag. Meanwhile, the captain concentrated on positioning the searchlight, looking outside to locate its beam. Neither pilot monitored the continuing descent.
At 220ft, the EGPWS issued a terrain caution, followed four seconds later by a warning at 180ft. The crew initiated an emergency climb, and the helicopter descended to 150ft above the sea before recovering.
CONDITIONS?
Night operations over water, with limited external visual references despite generally favourable weather. Reflections from the illuminated drilling rig complicated the captain’s searchlight positioning.
The short sector reduced preparation time and increased workload during the approach.
OUTCOME?
The helicopter recovered without damage or injuries. After discussing the incident while airborne, the crew incorrectly attributed the descent to an inadvertent radar-altitude adjustment and continued the planned training, completing nine night landings and take-offs.
The cockpit voice recording of the incident was subsequently overwritten.
WHY?
The investigation identified five contributing factors, highlighting how several individually manageable threats combined to break normal operational safeguards.
1) Automation mode awareness. An inadvertent selection cancelled the altitude capture. Although the intended heading mode was subsequently confirmed, neither pilot recognised the additional vertical-speed selection.
2) Monitoring and divided attention. The copilot became occupied with performance calculations while the captain adjusted the searchlight. Neither maintained effective flight-path monitoring. Required altitude-capture and deviation calls were missed.
3) Workload management. An unresolved performance calculation was revisited during a critical phase below 1,000ft ASL, contrary to procedures prioritising monitoring duties.
4) Experience and competence. Both pilots were highly experienced overall but had only 13 and 9 hours respectively on the S-92 at night. Their limited familiarity increased workload and susceptibility to error.
5) Organisational risk management. The pre-flight assessment considered night operations and overall experience on type but failed to account for the crew’s combined limited night experience on type.
Following the incident, procedures were strengthened for night approaches, crew experience pairing, cockpit lighting and automation monitoring.
This accident is another example of automation mode awareness and the importance of verification and effective monitoring. When both pilots become occupied with secondary tasks, an unnoticed mode change can rapidly develop into a critical aircraft state.
REFERENCE?
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2026). Ground proximity alerts involving Sikorsky S-92A, 71 km north-north-west of Exmouth Aerodrome, Western Australia, 1 February 2025. Final Investigation Report AO-2025-005.
Note:
Accident reports selected from the following open source databases: US NTSB; UK AAIB; Flight Safety Foundation’s Aviation Safety Network; Australia’s ATSB. Ireland’s AAIU; Taiwan’s TTSB; France’s BEA; Spain’s CIAIAC. Germany’s BFU.
